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Between the late 90’s and the beginning of the 21st century in Japan the
unemployment rate among young people (under the age of 30) grew from
4.7% in 1993 to 9.8% in 2002. However, the high unemployment rate of
young people (9.8%, compared to an average rate of 5.4% in 2002) did not
turn into a major social issue in the mass media because it is considered
that familial support is enough to keep the life of the young unemployed
stable.
This paper investigates the relationship between the unemployment of
young never-married women and the ﬁnancial situation of their parents,
using The Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) from 1994 to 2004.
I use the reform of the eligibility age(only for male) as the instrumental
variable, to identify the parental economic strength. The result shows the
decrease of the discretionary expenditure of the unemployed people and
the ﬁnancial strength of their parents are negatively correlated. Also, the
ﬁnancial strength of the parents negatively aﬀects the re-employment rate
of the respondents.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper investigates the labor supply of young women who lived with
their parents in Japan between the late 90’s and the beginning of the 21st
century.
Between the late 90’s and the beginning of the 21st century in Japan
the unemployment rate increased and hit an all-time high of 5.1% in 2002 (
4.8% as of 2005), mainly young people under the age of 30 and old people
between the ages of 60 and 64. In this time period the unemployment rate
of young people, between the ages of 20 and 24, hit an all-time high of 8.3%
in 2002, and for those between the ages of 25 and 29, it hit an all-time high
of 7.7% in 2002.
[Table 1 The rate of unemployment by age group (Women)]
However, this phenomenon did not turn into a major social issue in the
mass media as it did in the case of unemployed elderly people. Mass media
trumpeted the unemployment of the middle-aged and older. There are three
reasons why this phenomenon did not turn into a major social issue.
First, the reason why the unemployment of the middle aged is more
serious. Most of this generation are heads of households, so they shoulder
the responsibility of their dependants, such as a spouse, children and parents.
If the middle age layer loses their income, their family become destitute, and
lose thier home.
Second, the reason why young people’s unemployment was considered
less serious was that the main reason young people left their jobs was “Vol-
untary unemployment”. “Voluntary unemployment” means that they do
not want to stay in their jobs, and they are liable to leave if they are at all
unsatisﬁed. Thus the young people’s unemployment was considered to be
one of personal choice.
And Finally, since their parents ensure the livelihood of their children,
young people therefore do not have to be thrown onto the street.
In Japan slightly less than 70% of never married people live with their
parents ( 63.0% for male, 72.5% for female). They are looked after by their
parents, they pay less living expenses than those who live alone, so are able
to enjoy leisure and shopping and other lifstyle beneﬁts. If you compare
the rate of the unemployed who live with their parents with the rate of the
unemployed who live alone, you ﬁnd that the number who live with their
parents (10.5%) is higher than the number who live alone (4.8%)1.
What one can infer from this phenomenon is that unemployed young
people are taken care of by their parents. Fortunately for young people,
1Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry staﬀ made Table 3 using the original Labor
fource survey data. As common researchers can not use the original govermental data, I
can not investigate values from the year 2000.
2their parental generation (between the ages of 44 and 59) earn relatively
high wages on a seniority-based pay scale, and so can aﬀord to their children.
[Table 2 The ratio of living with parents for youth]
[Table 3 The ratio of unemployment by relationship of heads of household]
I am concerned with the third reason in this paper. According to re-
search conducted in foreign countries, it is recognized that living with par-
ents discourages young people from entering the workforce (Holzer(1990)).
McElory (1985) says that living with parents is the same as jobless insurance
for young people. People who live with their parents are liable to remain in
the state of unemployment if the provided wages are less than the wages they
want. Card & Lemieux (2000) found that young people adjust to change
in labor market forces through living arrangements. For example, in times
of depression(the employment-population rate was low, lower wage) young
men adapt by continuing to live with their parents and by attending school
(young women adapt by continuing to live with their parents).
In Mediterranean Europe most young adults live with their parents too
2. In Manacorda & Moretti (2005) the eﬀect of parents’ income on various
children’s behavior is estimated (living with parents, children’s work, chil-
dren’s earnings). According to the results, parental income has a positive
eﬀect on living with parents, and a negative eﬀect on children’s work.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the evidence regarding the labor
supply of never-married women who live with their parents and I validate
the fact that the unemployment of young people is “lavish unemployment”.
I used results from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (hereafter
JPSC, 1994-2004)3 in this paper.
This article has two features. Firstly, I used the pension reform (rise in
pension eligibility age) as the instumental variable. In this study I analyzed
the eﬀect of parental income on the re-employment of their unemployed
children never married women who live with them. Parental income and
economic strength is strongly associated with children’s educational achieve-
ment, which correlate with labor supply. And parental income is correlated
with error term of the labor supply equation. It causes a positive spuri-
ous correlation. Facing the diﬃculty of how to identify parental economic
strength on children’s output, I used the reform of eligibility age as an instru-
mental variable, which eﬀect parental income, but does not eﬀect children’s
labor supply. The estimation results show that parental economic strength
has a negative eﬀect on children’s labor re-employment. As parental income
2Data from the European Community Household Panel Survey (1996), around 80% of
Italian men aged 18-30 live with their parents, and in Spain 65%, in Portugal 78%.
3The Institute for Research on Household Economics provides the data
(http://www.kakeiken.or.jp/english/index.html).
3increases by 1 million yen ( $ 5,555) , the rate of re-employment of their
children decreases 7.4-8.1%.
Secondly, in Japan most of the previous research about the labor supply
of women is focused on married women. Recently, the rate of never-married
women has grown rapidly, therefore research about women in this group has
enormous signiﬁcance.
[Table 4 the rate of unmarried by age group]
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
changes in household behavior after leaving a job. Section 3 describes why
unmarried women who live with their parents leave their jobs, how they
cope with the state of unemployment. Section 4 describes the reasons of
reemployment.Section 5 describes the theory that examining, the eﬀect of
the parents economic strength toward their children’s employment. Section
6 describes the empirical model, explaining the data. Section 7 introduces
the estimation results, and discusses the relationship between the stated
preference and the action taken, and the conclusions are presented in the
last section.
2 Data, Descriptive Statistics
2.1 Data
The Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers has been conducted by the In-
stitute for Research on Household Economics(hereafter IRHE) since 1993.
JPSC targeted 1,500 females aged 24 to 34 nationwide (cohortA)in 1993.
Furthermore, 500 females of same generation aged 24 to 27 (cohortB) were
added to survey subjects in 1997, and 836 females aged 24 to 29 (cohortC)
were also added in 2003. The survey aims to ﬁgure out lifestyle condition
of young females from the perspectives of income, expenditure and saving,
working behavior, family relationship, time allocation within couple, and
satisfaction.
[Table 5 The age composition of respondent to JPSC survey]
2.2 Leaving a job
In this section, I observed the current status of leaving a job for young
never-married women.
In the JPSC an averaged 8.5% of the never-married sample changed their
job, and 5.0% stopped working, and 4.6% began working again (they were
unwaged the previous year). To put it the other way around, the averaged
ﬁxation percentage is more than 75.8% during the suvey year.
4The average terms when they keep on working at present company is 5.5
years (median 4.5 years) 4.
[Table 6 The change of employment status]
I investigated the change of job status among never-married women.
About 62.0% of the women who changed their jobs kept working fulltime
and went to other companies.
I could not ﬁnd deﬁnitive evidence of ”labor supply as a hobby”, which
is where young people are likely to change from a regular job which is de-
manding and inﬂexible, to part-time work which is relatively more relaxed.
[Table 7 The change of job status]
Why do never-married women leave their jobs? I looked at the 11 years
(1994-2004) of data for reasons for job change and turn over (quitting a
job). Most reasons for changing jobs were to do with dissatisfaction with
the conditions of employment and dissatisfaction with the contents of work
(“because working conditions were bad there”(37.4%), “the job was unsuit-
able for me”(28.5%)).
The most common reason for turnover was the same reason as job change
(“because working conditions were bad there”(24.4%), ”the job was unsuit-
able for me”(19.3%)). And the second-most common reason was “because I
was married”(quit after getting married)(24.44%). I came to the conclusion
that the most common reason for job change and turnover for young never-
married is voluntary resignation from the results mentioned above. This
fact is consistent with previous work.
[Table 8 The reasons for changing a job and quitting a job]
2.3 The changes in household behavior after leaving a job
In this section I noted that the changes in household behavior (income,
savings, expenditure) after leaving a job.
4According to age brackets, between the ages of 25 and 29 : 4.3 years(average), 4.1
years(median), between the ages of 30 and 34 : 6.5 years(average), 6.5 years(median),
between the ages of 35 and 39 : 10.3 years(average), 11.5 years(median), between the of
ages 40 and 44 : 14.1 years(average), 15.5 years(median)
52.3.1 Income
In the case of changing jobs, there was a slight decrease in yearly income.
The average change account was a decrease of 18,780yen(about $ 160). At
t h es a m et i m e ,i nt h ec a s eo fq u i t t i n gj o b s ,t h e r ew a sal a r g ed e c r e a s ei n
income by 1,120,000yen(about $ 9,700). It is a very serious decrease in
income when quitting a job.
[Table 9 The change of income]
2.3.2 Savings
Generally, the savings of unmarried women who left their jobs increased
slightly (increase in saving 59,444yen = $ 512 for changing a job, 229,791yen
= $ 1980). It is noteworthy that the savings of those who quit their jobs
(became unemployed) is larger than the savings of those who changed thier
jobs (employed).
Under ordinary circumstances out-of-work employees reach into their
savings to get by, therefore their savings are suppose to decrease. The
increase in saving reﬂected that the unemployed kept up with their living
cost by means other than their savings.
In the second place I distributed the saving according to their parental
income brackets(except ”parents were dead”, ”No Answer”). If parental
income is less than 5 million yen(about $ 43,100), there was an increase of
174,615yen (about $ 1,500). If parental income is 5 million yen and over,
there was an increase of 220,952yen(about $ 1,900).
[Table 10 The change of savings]
2.3.3 Expenditure
The average expenditure5 of those who changed their job increased 6,174 yen
($ 50). The averaged expenditure of those who quit their job (became unem-
ployed) decreased signiﬁcantly by 20,570 yen ($ 180). Generally, people who
have just lost their jobs decreases their expenditure slightly, because most
of them have saved money for the unexpected, and recieved unemployment
insurance.
But as mentioned above, unemployed unmarried women did not spend
their savings, and the unemployment beneﬁt payment in Japan is half of the
5This survey deﬁnes expenditure of unmarried women as “the expenditure which take
out of their purse at last month(September)”
6wage which they earned (in the case of voluntary unemployment, the period
of unemployment beneﬁt payments is three months ). It is not abundant.
Then I distributed the expenditure according to parents’ income brack-
ets. If parental income is less than 5 million yen, there was a decrease of
7,250yen (about $ 60). If parental income is 5 million yen and over, there
was a decrease of 23,950yen (about $ 210).
About 91% of nerver-married women who are unemployed live with
their parents. So they can make their parents shoulder all life expenses
for them(unemployed women). And they can trim the costs of their living
which they have to pay. Furthermore, never-married women who are unem-
ployed and have wealthy parents get more parental transfers (e.g. allowance
and remittance, etc.) than other people.
[Table 11 The change of expenditure]
[Table 12 The change of familial transfer]
3 The ways of coping with unemployment
I investigated their ways of coping of the young unemployed during their
jobless periods (multiple answers).
The most common way of coping with no pay for those who quit a
job is withdrawing their savings (49.45%)6. The second most common way
is retirement allowance and/or insurance beneﬁts (43.96%) 7,t h et h i r di s
parental revenue (24.18%)8.
Next I distributed “The ways of coping with unemployment” according
to parents’ income brackets. If parental income is less than 5 million yen, the
most common way of that is retirement allowance and/or insurance beneﬁt
(57.89%). While if income is 5 million yen and over, the most common
way is parental revenue (42.0%), and withdrawing their savings (46.0%).
The results show that unmarried women who have wealthy parents take
advantage of family support which functions as unemployement insurance
in Japan.
Tachibanaki (1999) said that, “In the Japanese policy of joblessness, it
has been practiced that family functions as a form of income security for
the unemployed in Japan. demand for unemployment insurance has been
scarce.” It is believed that the system of unemployment insurance has not
developed enough, family help is very important.
[Table 13 The response to costs of living by the unemployed]
6“I drew my savings.”
7“I could go well with a retirement allowance and/or insurance beneﬁt for a while.”
8“I could go well with my parent’s revenue.”
7Lastly, I checked the unemployed womens’ desire for employment and
actual job-hunting. I watched their desire for employment according to
parental income. The results show that in the case of less than 5 million yen
68.75% of unemployed wanted to start to work, while in the case of more
than 5 million yen 50.00% of that wanted to start work.
And in a similar way I watched their job-hunting according to parental
income. These results show that unemployed people who have wealthy par-
ents are reluctant to work.
What it comes down to is that women who live with their parents are
blessed with parental support. Thus they do not feel the need, and they are
reluctant to restart work.
[Table 14 The desire for employment and job hunting ]
4 Reentering the workforce
In this section, I observed the reason of reemployment 9.T h em o s tc o m m o n
reason is “Because I was interested in the work oﬀered to me.”(38.24%). The
seconsd most reason is “Because the company or organization was closer to
my house or the commuting distance was shorter.” (29.41%).
Next, I distributed “The reasons of reemployment” according to parental
income branckets. But in both group(less than 5 million yen, more than
5 million yen) the most reason is same(“Because I was interested in the
work oﬀered to me.”), there is not much diﬀerence in rate of responce.
If I pick up relative diﬀerence between both group, in case of more than
5 million yen children select the job, because interest in contents of job,
making use of their ability and gainning a skill. These reason are more
fastidious(paticular) reasons than compelling that. parental support enable
to search for fastidious job.
[Table 15 The reason of choosing the company ]
But results of descriptive statistical analysis in chapter 2 and 3 are ten-
tative, because the number of sample are small. Therefore I did another
analysis in the following chapters for complementing these results.
5M o d e l
To formalize the idea that parental income, economic strength, aﬀects the
re-employment behavior of the never-married women. I constructed a sim-
ple search model that captures the eﬀect of parental income on the re-
employment behavior of their children(never-married women).
9“Why did you choose the company or organization in which you are now working?
”(This question is Multiple Answers.)
8Let us consider Ve(w) denotes the present value, which worker receive the
best oﬀer, w denotes wage. Denoting Vu as her discouted expected utility
when she is unemployment, r as her discount factor, δ as the probability




[b + δEmax{Ve(w),V u} +( 1− δ)Vu]( 1 )
It is assumed she get b instantaneous utility while unemployment, and
δEmax{Ve(w),V u} is the discounted expected value of following the optimal
policy if she receives oﬀer, (1−δ)Vu is the expected value which she continues





[b + δEmax{Ve(w),V u}]( 2 )
The optimal policy is for job searcher to accept the oﬀer when Ve(w)
bigger than Vu.L e td e ﬁne w∗ as the threshold wage, the value of threshold
point means Ve(w)=Vu.
w∗ = rVu (3)




(w +( 1− q)Ve(w)+qVu)( 4 )
q denote the rate of losing employment, w denote instantaneous util-





Substituting the discounted expected utility of unemployed for equa-
tion(3), equation(4), we arrive at,
w∗ = b +
δ
r + q
{Emax(w,w∗) − w∗)( 6 )
We arrive at the reseavation wage equation,





(w − w∗)dH(w) (7)
9Let H(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function of all possible
wages. And H(w) denotes the probability of oﬀered wage. We obtain the












< 0( 8 )
I am concerned with b, which means the b instaneous utility of unem-
ployment. The utility is eﬀect by non-market eﬀects, which are deﬁned
as famillial eﬀects here. I focused on two points in this model. Firstly,
I marked trc transfers from parent to children (housework which are pro-
vided by their mother, pocket money and allowance provided by parent).
I assumed as parental income yp increases, children are given with more
transfers(non labor income). When children’s non labor income increases, it
aﬀects labor supply. In particular in the case of living with parents, children
enjoy the beneﬁts of not only ﬁnancial transfer, but also material transfer
(overall household work, e.g. cleaning, cooking, etc. ).
I checked the relationship between parental income and ﬁnancial trans-
fer(see Table 16). The result shows that there was positive correlation. I
wanted to examine the relation between parental economic strength and
children’s labor supply:
trc =1 .540(0.399)ypt−1 + βX + µ + u (9)
where parenthetical values denote standard deviation, and µ denotes in-
dividual characteristic eﬀects (I analyzed the equation using random-eﬀects
tobit model).
[Table 16 The parental income eﬀect on ﬁnancial transfer]
Secondly, I noted the relative bargaining power of never married women.
I assumed that the determinants of bargaining power are the number of
siblings, the order of birth, the presence of male child(ren), etc.. If the
sample is a single child, she is sole recipiet of her parents’ attention, if she
is the eldest child, she is given preferential treatment by the parents. Since
Asian parents tend to give preferential treatment to male children, if she
had no brothers, she could get more of her parents’ attenstion than children
who have brothers.
6 Empirical model
This model has a problem in empirical estimate in that parental income
would be endogenous to children’s labor supply. It causes estimations to
10be inconsistent. For example, following Manacorda & Moretti (2005), I as-
sumed unobserved shocks to market conditions. When there is a recession,
parental income decreases, and employment opportunities for children de-
crease. It seems there is a positive spurious correlation between parent’s
income and children’s labor supply. Conversely, in an economic boom, there
would seem to be a positive correlation parental income rises, there are more
jobs available for children.
Through parental investment in children10, rich family’s children have
more choices available in employment due to being highly-educated. It seems
there is a positive spurious correlation.
Thus, to execute a more precise estimation, it is necessary to exploit
the variation of parental income, parental economic strength, due to the
exogenous shock by the instrumental variable estimation. The instrument
variables should be correlated to parent’s income and uncorrelated to chil-
dren’s labor supply.
I used the reform of the social security system in Japan as an instrumen-
tal variable. Manacorda & Moretti (2005) used “changes in social eligibility
and retirement age introduced in Italy in 1992”(p15), as a measured instru-
ment for parent’s income. They assumed the reform is uncorrelated with
determining factors of children’s labor supply. In Japan the age of pension
payment eligibility has been raised in phases (from 60 years old in 2001 to
65 years old in 201311).
The reform would promote the parental labor supply, because some peo-
ple would have to work to compensate for the period of time when pensions
were not provieded. The Japanese government also promotes the elderly
labor supply through the Law for the Stabilization of Employment of the
Aged in 2000, this law mandates companies to extend the age of retirement
from 60 to 65 whenever possible(Article 9 of the Law).
The reform of pensionable age does not have a direct connection with
the behavior of unmarried women. I used father’s under the eligibility age
dummy (planholder = 0, not planholder = 1) as an instrumental variable in
this article.
In fact, the ﬁndings in Table 16 already suggest that parental income may
have a negative eﬀect on the labor supply of children (unmarried women).
I estimated the following probit model with instrumental variables.
Yi =
½
1i f Y ∗
i > 0
0i f o t h e r w i s e
(10)
10Behrman & Taubman(1990), Ermisch & Francesconi(2001a), Ermisch &
Francesconi(2001b)invetigated association between Parental income or attainment
and child earning or achivement
11F o rm e n .W h i l ef o rw o m e n ,f r o m6 0y e a r so l di n2 0 0 6t o6 5y e a r so l di n2 0 1 8
11Y ∗
i = α1 + α2Pi + α3Xi + ui (11)
which Y ∗ represents a latent variable, Y ∗ represents the re-employment
dummy (If the individual i gains re-employment, 1. If the individual i re-
mains unemployed, 0.), Pi represents endogenous variable(parental income),
Xi represents other characteristics.
Pi = β1Zi + β2Xi + υi (12)
(υi,u i) ∼ N(0,Σ) (13)
Other characteristics include age, age (squared ), unemployment periods,
regional active opening rate12, city-size where the respondent lives (top 14
cities13, other cities [reference], towns and villages), education acchievments
(junior high school, high school [reference], vocational college, junior college,
university & graduate school), qualiﬁcations14, the receipt of unenployment
insurance beneﬁts in previous year, year dummies 15.
The subsample which was used in this analysis is restricted to (1) never-
married women who did not work in the previous year and changed jobs dur-
ing the year (soon after the previous year’s survey to right before reference
year’s survey, e.g. November.1999-October.2000), and (2) never-married
women living with their parents. The restriction causes the sample selec-
tion to be bias. So I used the inverse probablity of “the probability of
getting to be unemployed people” and “people who change jobs” as weight
for avoiding sample selection bias.
And I use the survival model to check the eﬀect of famillial transfer from
parents on childrens’ reemployment directly.
12I use the regional active opening ratio (http://wwwdbtk.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/kouhyo/data-
rou16/jikei/jikeiretu09.xls).
13Sapporo, Sendai, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo in 23 wards, Kawasaki, Yokohama, Nagoya,
Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Kitakyushu, Fukuoka.
14medical doctor, pharmacist, clinical nurse, de n t a lh y g i e n i s t ,d e n t a lm e c h a n i c ,c l i n i c a l
technologist, social welfare counselor, dietitian, teacher, childminder, attorney, judicial
scrivener, administrative scrivener, chartered accountant, enrolled agent, architect, inte-
rior coordinator, advisory specialist for consumers’ aﬀairs, hairdresser, data processing
specialist, etc..
15Here we use maximum likelihood estimation. Because the estimation has some advan-
tages in comparision with two step mestimation(Wooldridge 2002, p476). The advanteges
means more eﬃcient, and getting direct estimates of the parameters.
127 Empirical Results
Table 18 reports the results of estimations on the determination of re-
employment of nevermarried women (Table 17 reports descriptive statistics).
The result of the IV estimation that uses the father’s age dummy in-
dicates that parental income decreases the rate of re-employment of their
unmarried children, and the eﬀect is signiﬁcant in all cases. As parental in-
come increases by 1 million yen (about $ 5,555) , the rate of re-employment
decreases by about 8%. The result of normal probit estimation is about 3%
(Appendix Table 1). We indentiﬁed the underestimation by endogeneity.
The test statistics in the Wald test of the exogeniety of the instrumented
v a r i a b l e si ss i g n i ﬁcant (signiﬁcant level 5-10%)16.
The eﬀects of other variables is seen as follows. The higher the rate of
educational achievement, the higher the rate of re-employment. The top 14
cities dummy decreased the rate of re-employment.
Next I checked the familial attributes eﬀects (e.g. the order of birth,
the number of siblings, the presence of male siblings) on reemploymet of
never married women. Column (2) reports the IV Probit results including
the eldest child dummy (Ei = 1, if the never-married woman was the eldest
child. Ei = 0, otherwise). The coeﬃcient of the eldest child dummy was
negative, but was not signiﬁcant. Column (3) reports the IV Probit results
including the single child dummy (Si = 1, if the never-married woman did
not have brothers and sisters. Si = 0, otherwise). The coeﬃcient of the
single child dummy was positive, and was not signiﬁcant.
Column (4) reports that including the single child / sister dummy(SSi =
1, if the never-married woman was a single child, or had sister(s). SSi =0 ,
otherwise.) It is believed that men have more power in the household. They
are likely to be the primary beneﬁciary of their parents’ legacy. Thus, male
children receive more money than female children.
Our major ﬁndings are summarized as follows. First, the father’s age
dummy (IV) indicates that parental income decreases the rate of re-employment
of their unmarried children, and the eﬀect is signiﬁcant. This result com-
plements the result in chapter 3 (as parental income increases, the desire
for employment decreases, and they are reluctant to go job hunting ). Sec-
ond, the familial attributes eﬀects (no brother dummy) decreased the rate
of re-employment. It is believed that compared to women who have male
siblings, they can get more of their parents’ love. So they can enjoy the
beneﬁt of parental economic strength, and they are reluctant to reenter the
workforce.
Lastly I used cox proportional hazard model, and I checked the eﬀect
of ﬁnaicial transfer and parent income on the reemployment rate separately
16Appendix Table1 reports the results of pooled probit estimation. The pooled probit
estimated eﬀect of parental income is much smaller.
13( Appendix Table 3, 4 ). In consequence, not parent income but ﬁnancial
transfer has signiﬁcantly eﬀect. For an increase in transfer increases by
10,000 yen (about $ 90), the hazard is multipled by 0.974.
[Table 17 Descriptive Statistics]
[Table 18 The Re-employment Function (IV Probit)]
[Appendix Table 1 The Re-employment Function (Pooled Probit 1) ]
[Appendix Table 2 The Re-employment Function (Pooled Probit 2) ]
[ Appendix Table 3 The Re-employment Function (Cox Model Analysis 1)]
[Appendix Table 4 The Re-employment Function (Cox Model Analysis 2)]
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigated the eﬀects of the parental economic strength on
labor supply of never-married unemployed women, using “Japanese Panel
Survey of Consumers” data (1994-2004) .
In chapter 2 and 3, I analyzed descriptive statistics to investigate the
changes of household behavior (expenditure, saving, job-hunting, etc.) by
the unemployed and those who are changing jobs. These results show that
never-married unemployed women, especially those who have rich parents,
made their parents shoulder all living expenses for themselves (unemployed
women). Furthermore, nerver-married women who are unemployed and have
rich parents got more parental ﬁnancial assistance (e.g. allowances and
remittances, etc.) than other people. They were also more reluctant to
start to looking for a new job.
In chapter 7, I estimated the eﬀect of parental income on labor supply
of unemployed women. The estimation is very diﬃcult because the parental
income is endogenous. I used the reform of the social security system as
an instrumental variable. The result of the estimation is that the parental
income has a negative eﬀect on the labor supply of unemployed women.
It is believed that familial support works well for never-married women
who live with their parents in Japan, but familial support represses the
desire of the never-married unemployed women to look for a new job, and
consequently exacerbates Japan’s labor shortage.
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16Table 1 The Rate of Unemployment by Age Group(Women) 
 
Year
15腠19 20腠24 25腠29 30腠34 35腠39 40腠44 45腠49 50腠54 55腠59 60腠64 65腠
Total years old or more
1990 2.2 5.7 3.7 3.7 2.5 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 -
1991 2.2 5.8 3.8 4.0 2.5 2.2 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.8 1.4 -
1992 2.2 6.0 3.7 3.5 3.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 0.6
1993 2.6 6.3 5.1 4.5 3.4 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.3 2.0 0.6
1994 3.0 6.8 5.0 5.4 3.8 2.5 2.4 2.0 1.6 1.8 2.0 0.6
1995 3.2 7.5 5.8 5.2 4.7 3.0 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.7 2.6 0.6
1996 3.3 9.1 6.2 5.5 4.6 3.0 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.6 0.6
1997 3.4 7.6 6.1 6.3 4.4 2.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 0.6
1998 4.0 9.1 6.9 6.7 5.6 3.7 2.9 2.4 2.2 2.8 3.1 0.6
1999 4.5 9.5 7.9 7.1 5.8 4.2 3.3 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.8 0.5
2000 4.5 9.8 7.5 6.7 6.0 4.1 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.1 4.5 1.1
2001 4.7 11.1 8.2 7.2 6.4 4.8 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 4.4 1.1
2002 5.1 10.2 8.3 7.7 7.1 5.2 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.2 4.3 1.1
2003 4.9 10.5 8.2 6.9 6.6 5.3 4.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.2 1.1
2004 4.4 11.1 7.7 5.9 5.7 5.2 3.6 3.1 3.1 2.8 3.4 1.1
Sources: Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry, Labor force survey (http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/longtime/zuhyou/lt03-03.xls)














# ofPeople who livie with
Parent(s)(10,000person)
the rate of living with
parent(s)(%)
Total 2,699 1,308 㐸㐶
Unmarried People 1,672 1,124 㘷㈲
male 935 589 㘲㤹
female 737 534 㜲㐶





Table 3. The Ratio of Unemployment by Relationship of Head's of Household 
慤⁯⁡ 慤❳獰 佴爠桯 湧汥桯畳潬搠⡬楶攠慬潮攩
ㄹ㤰 ㈮ ⸹
ㄹ㤹 㐮 ⸱ ㄰ 㐮






































































































































































 Table5. The Age Composition of Respondent to JPSC Survey 
CohortA:  24腠34years old Women(in 1993)
CohortB: 24腠27years old Women(in 1997)

























keep employed (employed膨employed) 2,078 75.8
job change (employed膨employed) 232 8.5
getting employed  (unemployed膨employed) 125 4.6
leaves a job  (employed膨unemployed) 137 5.0
keep unemployed (unemployed膨unemployed) 156 5.7
No answer 13 0.47
Total 2,741 100.0Table7    The Change of Job Status (Only Employee who Changed Their Job) 











part-time jobber / temporary employee
part-time jobber / temporary employee














Table8. The Reasons of Change a Job and Quit Job 
change job quit job change job quit job change job quit job
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
personnel reduction, or company
dissolution or bankruptcy
(10.61) (11.11) (12.82) (20.51) (3.39) (5.56)
work was temporary and unstable (13.41) (9.63) (8.97) (10.26) (18.64) (12.96)
working conditions were bad there (37.43) (24.44) (32.05) (23.08) (47.46) (24.07)
the job was unsuitable job for me (28.49) (19.26) (26.92) (12.82) (27.12) (22.22)
the member of my household
found a job, changed his or her job,
or was transferred to another office,
or because the office in which he or
she was working was transferred to
another place.
(1.12) (0.74) (1.28) (0.00) (0.00) (1.85)
For marriage (0.00) (21.48) (0.00) (10.26) (0.00) (35.19)
I was pregnant and took care of my
health
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
I was sick (6.70) (9.63) (3.85) (7.69) (10.17) (14.81)
I had to care for the member of my
household
(1.12) (3.70) (2.56) (5.13) (0.00) (3.70)
I could not make effective use of
my abilities for my work there
(15.64) (2.22) (12.82) (2.56) (20.34) (1.85)
I was not in a good human
relationship with my boss and
comrades there.
(15.08) (15.56) (14.10) (15.38) (15.25) (11.11)
I was dismissed. (4.47) (2.96) (5.13) (7.69) (3.39) (1.85)
I wanted to learn in a university,
college or professional school, or to
prepare for studying abroad.
(1.68) (5.93) (1.12) (7.69) (0.00) (1.85)
Other (16.76) (17.04) (15.38) (20.51) (18.64) (11.11)
total=179 total=135 total=78 total=39 total=59 total=54
Parenal Income Parenal Income












Table.9 The Change of Income(Change a Job & Quit a Job) 
change a job
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
income(previous year, t-
1, 10,000yen)
164 232.79 116.79 88 242.52 129.77
income(reference year, t,
10,000yen)
164 230.91 110.20 88 130.38 129.41
difference(10,000yen)*1 164 -1.88 89.58 88 -112.15 147.50
the rate of change(%)*2 164 15.86 83.82 88 -32.05 78.46
income(previous year, t-
1, 10,000yen)
43 225.53 130.87 32 237.69 153.72
income(reference year, t,
10,000yen)
43 218.14 120.65 21 181.67 200.33
difference(10,000yen)*1 43 -7.40 114.06 21 -88.86 184.78
the rate of change(%)*2 42 21.19 117.84 20 -13.48 114.03
income(previous year, t-
1, 10,000yen)
41 258.54 115.89 39 238.87 140.35
income(reference year, t,
10,000yen)
39 257.28 109.25 25 101.12 79.81
difference(10,000yen)*1 39 -4.00 97.56 24 -145.88 133.12
































 Table10. The Change of Savings 
change a job
V a r i a b l e O b sM e a n S t d .  D e v .O b sM e a n S t d .  D e v .
savings(previous year, t-
1, 10,000yen)
126 228.74 214.07 96 240.46 274.19
savings(reference year,
t, 10,000yen)
126 234.68 220.44 96 263.44 354.35
difference(10,000yen)*1 126 5.94 103.64 96 22.98 151.94
the rate of change(%)*2 126 32.17 153.75 96 50.62 221.12
savings(previous year, t-
1, 10,000yen)
43 242.00 197.64 26 176.15 121.64
savings(reference year,
t, 10,000yen)
43 247.44 216.46 26 193.62 145.75
difference(10,000yen)*1 43 5.44 82.23 26 17.46 85.14
the rate of change(%)*2 43 22.25 87.10 26 32.02 116.88
savings(previous year, t-
1, 10,000yen)
41 202.56 222.15 42 257.81 244.66
savings(reference year,
t, 10,000yen)
41 233.17 232.48 42 279.90 248.42
difference(10,000yen)*1 41 30.61 111.03 42 22.10 112.80
the rate of change(%)*2 41 75.99 247.47 42 87.25 311.19
*1(savings_{t}-savings_{t-1})
*2(savings_{t}-savings_{t-1})/savings_{t-1}






















and overTable11. The Change of Expenditure*3 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
expenditure(previous year,
t-1, 1,000yen)
218 99.927 61.958 93 93.796 49.650
expenditure(reference
year, t)
218 106.101 59.354 93 73.226 64.125
difference(1,000yen)*1 218 6.174 64.060 93 -20.570 69.092
the rate of change(%)*2 218 46.072 190.281 93 -2.143 103.068
expenditure(previous year,
t-1, 1,000yen)
90 89.211 49.862 32 87.375 46.551
expenditure(reference year,  90 92.644 59.170 32 80.125 54.144
difference(1,000yen)*1 90 3.433 63.007 32 -7.250 58.476
the rate of change(%)*2 90 60.144 249.506 32 18.865 123.559
expenditure(previous year,
t-1, 1,000yen)
71 110.634 71.124 40 94.925 51.828
expenditure(reference year,  71 122.042 61.542 40 70.975 67.403
difference(1,000yen)*1 71 11.408 67.181 40 -23.950 66.562
the rate of change(%)*2 71 26.812 64.536 40 -19.355 67.627
*1(expenditure_{t}-expenditure_{t-1})
*2(expenditure_{t}-expenditure_{t-1})/expenditure_{t-1}
*3 expenditure from their own wallet in last month.
* except "parents were dead", "No.Answer" in parental income branckets.






















 Table12 The Change of Familial Transfer 
V a r i a b l e O b s M e a nS t d .  D e v . O b s M e a nS t d .  D e v . O b s M e a nS t d .  D e v .
Transfer(previous year,
t-1, 1,000yen)
24 10.25 11.86 50 12.00 31.33 296 7.80 12.17
Transfer(reference year,
t, 1,000yen)
24 8.25 12.27 50 3.82 9.11 296 3.62 7.89
difference(1,000yen)*1 24 -2.00 13.88 50 -8.18 31.47 296 -4.18 12.62
the rate of change*2(%) 24 69.31 331.75 50 -56.39 88.77 296 -27.09 184.77
Transfer(previous year,
t-1, 1,000yen)
4 3.25 2.06 20 6.00 8.28 82 5.02 5.13
Transfer(reference year,
t, 1,000yen)
4 0.50 1.00 20 3.40 7.98 82 1.60 2.52
difference(1,000yen)*1 4 -2.75 2.87 20 -2.60 3.72 82 -3.43 5.40
the rate of change*2(%) 4 -50.00 100.00 20 -56.42 64.27 82 -54.51 74.38
Transfer(previous year,
t-1, 1,000yen)
14 12.29 14.25 11 29.64 64.11 110 10.03 12.25
Transfer(reference year,
t, 1,000yen)
14 13.71 13.70 11 2.45 4.61 110 5.55 11.02
difference(1,000yen)*1 14 1.43 16.38 11 -27.18 63.24 110 -4.48 12.98
the rate of change*2(%) 14 147.38 407.86 11 -84.79 26.81 110 -12.10 195.48
*1(transfer_{t}-transfer_{t-1})
*2(transfer_{t}-transfer_{t-1})/transfer_{t-1}
* except "parents were dead", "No.Answer" in parental income branckets.























Table13 The Response to Costs of Living by The Unemployed 
 
























% 58.06 6.45 24.73 9.68 1.08 32.53
# 54/93 6/93 23/93 9/93 1/93 27/83
% 68.75 6.25 21.88 3.13 - 38.71
# 22/32 2/32 7/32 1/32 - 12/31
% 50 7.89 21.05 18.42 2.63 26.67






































% 9.52 18.52 24.87 2.65 1.59
# 18/189 35/189 47/189 5/189 3/189
% 13.95 24.42 24.42 2.33 2.33
# 12/86 21/86 21/86 2/86 2/86
% 13.33 11.67 21.67 1.67 1.67
# 8/60 7/60 13/60 1/60 1/60
% 24.18 43.96 49.45 1.11 2.2
# 22/91 40/91 45/91 1/91 2/91
% 21.05 57.89 47.37 0 0
# 8/38 22/38 18/38 0/38 0/38
% 42.00 36.00 46.00 2.00 0.00
# 21/50 18/50 23/50 1/50 0/50










































and overTable 15 The reason of choosing the company 
Parenal Income Parenal Income
less than 5 million yen 5 million and over
Percent Percent Percent
 Because a higher salary or
wage was offered to me.
(17.65) (24.14) (16.67)
 Because employees enjoyed
more holidays and a longer
vacation there.
(17.16) (19.54) (16.67)
Because employees had less
working hours and shorter
overtime work there,
 working hours were flexibly
scheduled there.
(18.75) (26.92) (10.53)
 Because the company or
organization was closer to my
house or the commuting
distance was shorter.
(29.41) (27.59) (30.00)
Because employees were little
or not transferred to other
offices.
(2.45) (3.45) (1.67)
 Because its activities were so
stable that I had no fear of
unemployment there.
(13.24) (17.24) (8.33)
I was pregnant and took care
of my health
(9.31) (9.20) (10.00)
Because I expected that I
might continue to work there
even if I would be married, I
expected that I might
continue to work there after
my childbirth.
(6.25) (0.00) (10.53)
  Because I expected that I
might learn a skill there.
(22.55) (21.84) (28.33)
Because I anticipated that I
might make effective use of
my abilities.
(26.47) (26.44) (31.67)
Because I was interested in
the work offered to me.
(38.24) (35.63) (46.67)




Table. 16    The Parental Income Effect on Financial Transfer 
Robust
dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z
Income(1million, t-1) -0.085 0.082 -3.42 *** -0.378 0.140 -2.70 ***
Parental Income(1million, t-1) 0.018 0.217 2.73 *** 0.125 0.042 3.01 ***
Constant -0.366 0.353 -1.04 -0.951 -0.578 -1.64 *
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Number of obs 255 255
Number of groups - 164
Wald chi2(10) 21.08 16.52
Prob > chi2 0.0123 0.0568
Pseudo R2 0.0773 -
Log (pseudo)likelihood -133.56 -122.65  
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0:
chibar2(01)
- 21.81
Prob >= chibar2 - 0.000
Robust Robust
dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z
Income(1million, t-1) -8.543 2.465 -3.47 *** -5.067 1.5237 -3.33 ***
Parental Income(1million, t-1) 2.341 0.639 3.66 *** 1.540 0.399 3.86 ***
Constant -20.415 9.836 -2.08 ** -6.264 6.067 -1.03   
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Number of obs 255 255
Number of groups - 164
Uncensored obs 65 65
LR chi^2 27.62
Prob > chi^2 0.0011
Pseudo R2 0.0346
Log likelihood -385.192 -560.099
Wald chi^2 - 24.68
Prob > chi^2 - 0.0033
Note: *** : Significant at 1% level, ** : 5%level, * : 10%level. 
Dependent Variable : Account
of Transfer
Dependent Variable : Transfer
Dummy(have an allowance=1,
otherwise=0)
Pooling Estimate(Probit) Panel Estimate(Probit,Random Effect)









Table17 Descriptive Statistics 
          
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
reemployment dummy 259 0.687 0.465 0 1
qualification dummy 259 0.521 0.501 0 1
the jobless period 259 22.178 34.701 0 199
active opening rate 259 0.671 0.234 0.36 1.4
insurance 259 0.220 0.415 0 1
education background
(junior high school)
259 0.042 0.202 0 1
education background
(high school)
259 0.371 0.484 0 1
education background
(vocational college)
259 0.112 0.316 0 1
education background
junior college)
259 0.278 0.449 0 1
education background
(university)
259 0.197 0.398 0 1
Top14 city 259 0.363 0.482 0 1
other city 259 0.544 0.499 0 1
towns and villages 259 0.093 0.291 0 1
age 259 30.645 4.637 25 43
parental income(10,000yen 259 555.994 406.538 124.5 1500
the eligibility dummy 259 0.421 0.495 0 1
the eldest child 259 0.718 0.451 0 1
single child 259 0.490 0.501 0 1
the eldest child/having
only female sibling
259 0.502 0.501 0 1
pocket money(10,000yen) 259 4.201 12.660 0 120  
 
 Table18 The Re-employment Function(IV Probit : ML) 
 
Robust Robust Robust Robust
dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z
Parental Income(1 million) -0.080 0.046 -5.75 *** -0.074 0.056 -4.55 *** -0.081 0.045 -5.9 *** -0.078 0.047 -5.79 ***
eldest child -0.083 0.362 -0.84
single child 0.044 0.214 0.68
no male sibling -0.177 0.228 -2.65 ***
qualificationed 0.059 0.250 0.77 0.065 0.255 0.87 0.057 0.250 0.74 0.052 0.249 0.71
jobless period -0.017 0.023 -2.34 ** -0.017 0.026 -2.27 ** -0.017 0.023 -2.34 ** -0.016 0.023 -2.3 **
active opening rate 0.438 0.623 2.29 ** 0.413 0.633 2.24 ** 0.446 0.618 2.36 ** 0.470 0.654 2.47 **
insurance 0.042 0.355 0.4 0.058 0.387 0.55 0.044 0.356 0.41 0.053 0.359 0.53
junior high school 0.037 0.427 0.29 -0.021 0.515 -0.13 0.052 0.419 0.44 0.093 0.459 0.82
high school
vocational college 0.248 0.467 2.42 ** 0.244 0.515 2.39 ** 0.260 0.462 2.64 *** 0.248 0.485 2.63 ***
 junior college 0.400 0.463 4.39 *** 0.389 0.519 4.15 *** 0.393 0.456 4.36 *** 0.379 0.465 4.46 ***
university 0.332 0.347 4.27 *** 0.322 0.357 4.36 *** 0.333 0.342 4.38 *** 0.313 0.355 4.24 ***
Top14 city -0.285 0.327 -2.66 *** -0.291 0.358 -2.58 *** -0.286 0.325 -2.68 *** -0.246 0.324 -2.42 **
other city
towns and villages 0.188 0.360 2.24 ** 0.182 0.382 2.24 ** 0.174 0.356 2.05 ** 0.152 0.369 1.8 *
age 0.083 0.354 0.76 0.085 0.385 0.76 0.096 0.346 0.91 0.083 0.350 0.82
age square -0.002 0.005 -0.94 -0.002 0.006 -0.89 -0.002 0.005 -1.1 -0.002 0.005 -0.96
constant -1.731 5.634 -0.31 -1.926 6.118 -0.31 -2.516 5.489 -0.46 -1.946 5.577 -0.35
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 ㄶ〮㘶 142.79 161.22 144.58
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log pseudolikelihood    -19820.28 -19813.3 -19815 -19785
Wald test of exogeneity:
chi2(1)
4.88 3.13 5.1 4.7
Prob > chi2  0.0272 0.077 0.024 0.0302
Number of obs 259 259 259 259
Note: *** : Significant at 1% level, ** : 5%level, * : 10%level. 
⠴ (1) ⠲ ㌩ 
Appendix Table1 The ReEmployment Function(Pooled Probit 1)
Robust Robust Robust Robust
dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z
Parental Income(1 million) -0.028 0.036 -2.88 *** -0.025 0.037 -2.78 *** -0.028 0.037 -2.89 *** -0.028 0.038 -3.00 ***
eldest child -0.129 0.319 -1.88 *
single child 0.065 0.253 0.98
no male sibling -0.141 0.261 -2.18 **
qualificationed 0.003 0.277 0.04 0.024 0.283 0.34 -0.002 0.277 -0.03 -0.001 0.281 -0.01
jobless period -0.023 0.020 -4.30 *** -0.021 0.020 -4.20 *** -0.023 0.020 -4.36 *** -0.021 0.021 -4.16 ***
active opening ratio 0.416 0.740 2.14 ** 0.366 0.739 2.00 ** 0.430 0.725 2.27 ** 0.438 0.767 2.36 **
insurance 0.089 0.334 1.12 0.100 0.338 1.38 0.089 0.342 1.11 0.091 0.334 1.28
junior high school -0.001 0.503 -0.01 -0.108 0.523 -0.71 0.022 0.502 0.18 0.050 0.535 0.43
high school
vocational college 0.220 0.414 3.12 *** 0.214 0.443 3.18 *** 0.227 0.396 3.50 *** 0.212 0.445 3.29 ***
 junior college 0.356 0.449 4.98 *** 0.342 0.461 5.07 *** 0.347 0.445 4.92 *** 0.329 0.473 4.84 ***
university 0.258 0.413 3.25 *** 0.253 0.401 3.61 *** 0.257 0.407 3.33 *** 0.238 0.410 3.36 ***
Top14 city -0.276 0.306 -3.08 *** -0.281 0.308 -3.25 *** -0.273 0.307 -3.06 *** -0.242 0.305 -2.91 ***
other city
towns and villages 0.143 0.484 1.49 0.140 0.491 1.59 0.126 0.481 1.28 0.108 0.494 1.15
age 0.072 0.426 0.64 0.075 0.457 0.66 0.082 0.424 0.74 0.069 0.438 0.66
age square -0.001 0.007 -0.70 -0.001 0.007 -0.69 -0.001 0.007 -0.81 -0.001 0.007 -0.69
constant ( coefficient) -2.572 6.701 -0.38 -2.803 7.189 -0.39 -3.383 6.649 -0.51 -2.786 6.882 -0.40
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 83.50 80.37 86.95 77.05
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R^2 0.67 0.6745 0.6692 0.677
Log pseudolikelihood    -49.05   -47.98 -48.75 -47.61
Number of obs 259 259 259 259
Note: *** : Significant at 1% level, ** : 5%level, * : 10%level. 
(1) ⠲ ⠴
 Appendix Table2 The ReEmployment Function(Pooled Probit 2)
Robust Robust Robust Robust
dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z dy/dx Std. Err. z
Pocket Money(10,000yen) -0.007 0.009 -2.91 *** -0.006 0.009 -2.74 *** -0.007 0.009 -2.80 *** -0.007 0.009 -2.96 ***
eldest child -0.145 0.330 -1.99 **
single child 0.051 0.243 0.76
no male sibling -0.132 0.278 -1.78 *
qualificationed -0.044 0.296 -0.54 -0.016 0.301 -0.2 -0.047 0.293 -0.59 -0.057 0.309 -0.71
jobless period -0.023 0.023 -3.7 *** -0.021 0.023 -3.53 *** -0.023 0.022 -3.73 *** -0.022 0.023 -3.61 ***
active opening ratio 0.481 0.747 2.34 ** 0.421 0.756 2.18 ** 0.494 0.736 2.44 ** 0.503 0.755 2.53 **
insurance 0.097 0.283 1.39 0.111 0.287 1.74 * 0.096 0.288 1.35 0.097 0.282 1.48
junior high school -0.060 0.499 -0.41 -0.194 0.520 -1.16 -0.036 0.502 -0.25 -0.007 0.521 -0.05
high school
vocational college 0.195 0.351 2.78 *** 0.189 0.376 2.85 *** 0.201 0.331 3.09 *** 0.197 0.357 3.03 ***
 junior college 0.341 0.503 3.87 *** 0.327 0.509 4.05 *** 0.335 0.488 3.88 *** 0.324 0.527 3.69 ***
university 0.231 0.366 2.95 *** 0.231 0.357 3.38 *** 0.230 0.362 2.97 *** 0.219 0.353 3.05 ***
Top14 city -0.255 0.295 -2.88 *** -0.268 0.307 -3.04 *** -0.251 0.293 -2.85 *** -0.222 0.286 -2.69 ***
other city
towns and villages 0.163 0.471 1.72 * 0.158 0.487 1.82 * 0.152 0.454 1.62 0.139 0.465 1.49
age 0.047 0.414 0.41 0.053 0.452 0.46 0.052 0.408 0.46 0.045 0.427 0.4
age square -0.001 0.006 -0.45 -0.001 0.007 -0.46 -0.001 0.006 -0.5 -0.001 0.007 -0.41
constant ( coefficient) -1.749 6.547 -0.27 -1.999 7.113 -0.28 -2.146 6.449 -0.33 -1.794 6.749 -0.27
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 59.49 58.29 60.07 57.59
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R^2 0.66 0.6704 0.663 0.6696
Log pseudolikelihood    -49.85   -48.59 -49.68 -48.71
Number of obs 259 259 259 259
Note: *** : Significant at 1% level, ** : 5%level, * : 10%level. 
(1) ⠲ ⠴Appendix Table3 Re-Employment Function (Cox Proportional Hazard 1)
Haz.Ratio Std. Err. z Haz.Ratio Std. Err. z Haz.Ratio Std. Err. z Haz.Ratio Std. Err. z
Parent Income(1million) 1.000 0.000 0.17 1.000 0.000 0.17 1.000 0.000 0.22 1.000 0.000 0.22
eldest child 0.979 0.249 -0.08
single child 1.261 0.268 1.09
no male sibling 0.667 0.156 -1.74 *
qualificationed 1.919 0.456 2.74 *** 1.922 0.458 2.74 *** 1.921 0.461 2.72 *** 1.928 0.457 2.77 ***
active opening ratio 2.816 1.462 1.99 ** 2.804 1.462 1.98 ** 3.047 1.591 2.13 ** 3.638 1.965 2.39 **
insurance 0.620 0.169 -1.76 * 0.620 0.169 -1.75 * 0.634 0.172 -1.68 * 0.618 0.168 -1.77 *
junior high school 0.844 0.528 -0.27 0.833 0.538 -0.28 0.944 0.599 -0.09 1.127 0.716 0.19
high school
vocational college 2.470 0.824 2.71 *** 2.463 0.825 2.69 *** 2.625 0.892 2.84 *** 2.550 0.851 2.80 ***
 junior college 2.668 0.804 3.26 *** 2.664 0.805 3.24 *** 2.673 0.799 3.29 *** 2.999 0.923 3.57 ***
university 1.672 0.533 1.61 1.676 0.537 1.61 1.729 0.549 1.72 * 1.719 0.549 1.70 *
Top14 city 0.531 0.138 -2.44 ** 0.530 0.138 -2.44 ** 0.550 0.143 -2.29 ** 0.559 0.145 -2.24 **
other city
towns and villages 1.513 0.489 1.28 1.511 0.490 1.27 1.486 0.479 1.23 1.451 0.471 1.15
age 1.951 0.887 1.47 1.949 0.887 1.47 1.943 0.891 1.45 1.768 0.815 1.24
age square 0.989 0.007 -1.48 0.989 0.007 -1.48 0.989 0.007 -1.47 0.991 0.008 -1.23
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood    -431.991 -431.987 -431.391 -430.452
 LR chi^2 41.11 41.11 42.31 44.18
 Prob >= chi^2  0.0023 0.0036 0.0025 0.0014
Number of obs 167 167 167 167
Note: *** : Significant at 1% level, ** : 5%level, * : 10%level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Appendix Table4 Re-Employment Function (Cox Proportional Hazard 2)
Haz.Ratio Std. Err. z Haz.Ratio Std. Err. z Haz.Ratio Std. Err. z Haz.Ratio Std. Err. z
Pocket money(10,000yen) 0.974 0.014 -1.87 * 0.974 0.014 -1.88 * 0.974 0.014 -1.85 * 0.972 0.013 -2.07 **
eldest child 1.071 0.273 0.27
single child 1.241 0.262 1.02
no male sibling 0.597 0.144 -2.14 **
qualificationed 1.819 0.436 2.5 ** 1.811 0.435 2.47 ** 1.816 0.439 2.47 ** 1.853 0.442 2.59 ***
active opening ratio 3.437 1.794 2.37 ** 3.490 1.835 2.38 ** 3.666 1.920 2.48 ** 4.779 2.589 2.89 ***
insurance 0.607 0.167 -1.82 * 0.607 0.166 -1.83 * 0.622 0.170 -1.74 * 0.608 0.166 -1.82 *
junior high school 0.803 0.494 -0.36 0.841 0.536 -0.27 0.893 0.557 -0.18 1.164 0.729 0.24
high school
vocational college 2.318 0.771 2.53 ** 2.333 0.778 2.54 ** 2.450 0.829 2.65 *** 2.425 0.809 2.65 ***
 junior college 2.523 0.749 3.12 *** 2.534 0.752 3.13 *** 2.544 0.751 3.16 *** 2.944 0.898 3.54 ***
university 1.761 0.533 1.87 * 1.747 0.531 1.84 * 1.820 0.552 1.97 ** 1.913 0.585 2.12 **
Top14 city 0.579 0.150 -2.1 ** 0.583 0.152 -2.07 ** 0.597 0.155 -1.98 ** 0.645 0.170 -1.67 *
other city
towns and villages 1.585 0.516 1.42 1.597 0.520 1.44 1.549 0.503 1.35 1.525 0.496 1.3
age 1.878 0.861 1.37 1.881 0.864 1.38 1.893 0.876 1.38 1.607 0.755 1.01
age square 0.989 0.007 -1.42 0.989 0.007 -1.43 0.989 0.008 -1.43 0.992 0.008 -1.05
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood    -428.902 -428.866 -428.378 -426.542
 LR chi^2 47.28 47.36 48.33 52
 Prob >= chi^2  0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0001
Number of obs 167 167 167 167
Note: *** : Significant at 1% level, ** : 5%level, * : 10%level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 